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This paper deals with the question of how unemployed workers in China responded to
the imposition of new employment practices, xiagang, which threatened their liveli-
hoods and most of all, their status as workers. The actions of unemployed workers are
not one-sided or simplistic — they are diverse, both active and passive, conservative
and progressive, violent and nonviolent, and aggressive and defensive at the same time.
Based on my fieldwork in Northeast China, I discover two types of actions.
Unemployed workers engage in the political action of 1) challengers: who embrace the
political notion of “rule of law,” and act to defend their entitlement, 2) evaders: who are
non-compliant to the new state policy, but engage in the spontaneous, individualized
activity of subsistence survival in everyday life. These actions are not mutually exclu-
sive, but rather situational, contingent upon both the socio-economic context and
unemployed workers’ interpretation of the situation.
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More than twenty five years after the initiation of the reform (1978-),
China has been deemed as a successful case of transformation from state
socialism (Burawoy, 1996). During this period, China has shown rapid eco-
nomic growth, and has become the fastest growing economy in the world.
However, in recent years, a surging problem of unemployment and the
demise of old socialist workfare have generated a challenge to China’s polit-
ical economy.1 Chinese state owned enterprises (SOEs) have been under
much severe financial pressure to cut the welfare benefits to their workers,
while they have to undertake organizational restructuring through massive
layoffs. The dismantlement of the old socialist workfare in China deprives
the workers of their previous entitlement to permanent employment and job
security as well as pensions and various welfare benefits. The rapid marke-
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tization and the demise of work-unit welfare have produced epochal change
— millions of workers without jobs in the workers’ state. The recent change
in the employment system and the increasing problem of the unemploy-
ment in China raises the crucial question about the successful nature of the
transformation from state socialism in China. 
China is certainly a country with contradictions, a site for the best and the
worst of the global economy, and also a space for everything — traditions, a
socialist past, a capitalist future, and chaos of current transformation. With a
population of more than one billion people, China is emerging as one of the
economic great powers in the twenty-first century, but it is also becoming a
place of extreme poverty for millions of unemployed workers. Once cele-
brated as heroes of socialism, workers are now marginalized, becoming
redundant, and then laid off without much support from the state. The
problem of unemployment has become the Achilles heel of China, which is
going through a long, tortuous process of a trasformation from socialism to
capitalism. The socialist principles of job security and comprehensive wel-
fare are now characterized as reasons for inefficiency, low productivity, poor
performance of firms, and the laziness of workers.
Workers are now left outside their work-unit and become merchants,
peasants, taxidrviers, or some type of service workers (repairing bikers,
hotel workers, hairdressers, cook, etc). The state enterprise ceases to exist as
a caring welfare institution (danwei) but has been transformed into a profit-
making enterprise (qiye). The Marxist-Leninist idea of work and welfare has
become the ideology of the radiant past. Xiagang, the policy that detached
workers from their work-unit, means that these ex-workers face the unsta-
ble, marketized world outside the factory. The rapid marketization and the
demise of work-unit welfare have produced epochal change — millions of
workers without jobs in a workers’ state.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the responses from these
“victims” of Chinese economic miracle — unemployed workers of the trans-
formation from socialism in China. This paper deals with the question of
how unemployed workers responded to the imposition of new employment
practices, xiagang, which threatened their livelihoods and most of all, their
status as workers. Do these unemployed workers accept the vision of the
marketized Utopian China propagated by the state? If not, how do they
react to it? The question of unemployed is one of the most heated debates in
regard to the transformation of post-socialist societies (Burawoy, 2001; Eyal,
Szelenyi, 2001; Stark, 2001). Here, I share some of the skepticism and ques-
tions of Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsley (2001), “where is the working-class-
cum — collective actor? At present, there is nothing but a demobilized, dis-
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organized mass or workers.” At present, the Chinese unemployed workers
are not what Marx expected them to be — a universal class under socialism,
but they have became divided and fragmented in the socialist process
(Walder, 1984) as well as in the transformation from socialism. Thus, it is
highly problematic to assume the essential nature of the “true” conscious-
ness of the workers. This paper attempts to accomplish a more careful non-
essentialist analysis based on the different, fluid types of responses of
unemployed workers in order to capture the complexity of action to the
new state policy.
UNEMPLOYED WORKERS AS POST-PROLETARIAT IN POST-SOCIALIST
CHINA
Under the name of a socialist market economy, the Chinese state no
longer views full employment as the essential feature of socialism, and
deprives workers of their status as socialist workers with permanent
employment and social security. Recent studies of labor politics in China
(Blecher, 2002; Solinger, 2002; Cai, 2002; Hurst and O’Brien, 2002; Lee, 2002)
report mixed findings about working class politics. Ching Kwan Lee reveals
(Lee, 2000; 2002) that contrary to Marxist conventional wisdom, unem-
ployed workers have become the most vocal protesters against the state and
the reform process. According to Lee, Chinese workers have become most
radicalized when they no longer work, when they are kicked out of the fac-
tories, and after going through the lived experiences of the underclass out-
side the “safe haven” of the socialist work-unit. They demand job security
and welfare benefits, and these are serious challenges to the legitimacy and
stability of the Chinese State because they raise issues about the fundamen-
tal characteristics of socialism — permanent employment and job security,
as well as the present direction of the reform. However, Blecher (2002)
emphasizes workers’ passivity, arguing that workers’ hegemonic acceptance
of values of the market and the state have led to a failure to challenge state
domination. Blecher states that “China’s workers are clearly subordinated to
the state.”(p.287) However, his own interview data suggest that we can
draw a different conclusion from the one that he makes. From his data, he
interprets “workers blamed their managers… some blame local government
officials…” These are not clear instances of subordination to the state.
Rather this reveals that these responses of the workevs are not quite consis-
tent or unwavering, but sometimes are hesitant and ambiguous, going
beyond the binary opposition of passivity and militant struggle. In addition,
it would also be an oversight to assume that unemployed workers are a
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homogenous, monolithic group since the actions of workers are not one-
sided or simplistic — they are diverse, both active and passive, conservative
and progressive, violent and nonviolent , and aggressive and defensive.
I call these Chinese unemployed workers the Post-Proletariat emerging
from the process of reform. The term Proletariat originally had two defini-
tions, 1) the working class, or the citizens of the lowest class who do not
own means of production, 2) and who thus have to sell their labor power
for their daily survival. My usage of the concept Proletariat emphasizes its
second meaning, and “post” means that they are not the working class
under capitalism, but a newly emerging lower class, who were thrown out
of the factory and forced to sell their labor power in post-socialism. They are
the ones who went through the lived experiences of “socialism betrayed”
(Lee, 1998) or “downward mobility” (Solinger, 2002) after being laid off
from their state enterprises. These workers might not be the aggressive
agents to overthrow capitalism in the strict Marxian sense, but they are
struggling for the socialist principle of “to each according to their labor,” the
right to be a worker, and have become serious challengers to the legitimacy
of the state in post-socialist China.2
Prior to reform in China, these unemployed workers were formerly revo-
lutionary socialist workers under the protection of paternalist state work-
fare: they did not have to face the forces and the tyranny of capital. Now,
however, they have become mere employees; they have lost their privileged
status as state workers and had to face cruelty of the market alone, without
the protection of the state. Of course, the Chinese working class has certain-
ly become divided and fragmented, after being unemployed or self-
employed; working on a probationary, temporary, and part-time basis or as
the industrial reserve army outside the state enterprises. However, this
process of a seemingly unmaking of the Chinese working class has a flip
side — increasing inequality and class polarization, go hand in hand with
potentials for the “making” of a new, marginalized post-proletariat outside
the industrial factory, not necessarily as the traditional working class in the
manufacturing sector. My use of the term “post-proletariat” tries to capture
this complex process of both the unmaking of old classes and the making of
new beings. This is why I use the term “post-proletariat” since they are not
traditional manufacturing workers in the strict Marxist sense. 
The term “making” is borrowed from E.P. Thompson’s pioneering work,
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2 For the stories of workers at the factory, Anita Chan (2001)’s China’s Worker Under Assault
and Feng Tongqing’s The Fate of Chinese Workers (Zhongguo Gongrende Mingyun), have excel-
lent descriptions of their hardship and struggle.
The Making of the English Working Class (hereafter MEWC), which is consid-
ered to be one of the best examples of historical sociology in the interpretive
tradition (Skocpol, 1984). Thompson writes about the unfolding of the
English working class from 1780 to 1832. Thompson’s concept of “class”
only makes sense in the context of class struggle, the actual historical
process of making classes. From Thompson’s perspective, class does not
lead to class struggle, but rather class struggle leads to the making of class.
By rejecting the structuralist argument of class as a bearer of big structure,
Thompson makes an effort to find agency in the working class, and to
understand how the working class makes history. As he criticizes other his-
torians and tries to give a voice to the working class:
Only the successful are remembered. The blind alleys, the lost causes, 
and the losers themselves are forgotten (MEWC, 12).
Similarly, I will attempt to find the “voices” of people who are the victims
of transformation from socialism to capitalism in China,3 and who have
become marginalized during the reform process. I am not able claim, nor
would I wish to, that my work represents the “correct” or “right” view of
the working class in China. Rather, my intention is, while observing the
Chinese transformation from socialism, to simply raise the question: “What
about workers? (Clark, 1993).”
Just like Thompson, my use of the term, “making” reflects that my inves-
tigation focuses on the process of “becoming” or “happening,” rather than a
simple correlation or causal relationships. “Making” also indicates that
something is in fact taking place in the society by shedding lights on the
aspect of human agency, the lived experiences, and the daily struggle of peo-
ple. As Thompson argues, “... we can not understand class unless we see it as
a social and cultural formation, arising from processes (ibid, 11)… the mak-
ing of the working class is a fact of political and cultural, as much as of eco-
nomic, history... the working class made itself as much as it was made…”
Thompson finds the “subject” and “experience” in the formation of the
English working class, from political, cultural, and historical relationships.
My aim is to grasp the unemployed worker’s collective lived experiences
and their nuanced, subtle form of action. 
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3 A sociologist Charles Ragin (1994: 83) discusses “Giving Voice” as a major contribution of
qualitative research. He points out “…By emphasizing close, in-depth empirical study, the
qualitative approach is well suited for the difficult task of helping uncover subtle aspects and
features of these groups, who lack voice in society.”
SOCIALIST WORKERS IN TRANSFORMATION: FROM “MASTERS” TO
VICTIMS
This paper is based upon ethnographic fieldwork in Changchun,
Shenyang, and Beijing from fall 2000 to spring 2001 and during the sum-
mers of 2002, 2004, and 2005, which includes more than 90 in-depth inter-
views with unemployed workers, state officials, and managers, as well as
archival documents. My ethnographic fieldwork offered data to understand
the new policies and how these new policies affects the lives of millions of
unemployed workers (Gupta, 1989).4
A new vision of society, with modern, efficient, rationalized welfare sys-
tem, was discussed extensively during the recent 16th party congress, when
the Chinese president Jiang Zemin retired, and Hu Jintao was chosen as a
new leader. In particular, the rule of law was heavily emphasized. The
Constitution of the Communist Party of China was amended and revised at
the 16th National Congress on November, 14. 2002. This was an effort to
improve and establish a more scientific, modern legal system. In the first
paragraph, the Constitution clearly affirms that the CCP is the party of both
the working class and the general population of China, and that Marxism-
Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the “Three
Represents” are the key components of its ideology. As Jiang Zemin stressed
in his speech,
“We should strengthen employment management in accordance with
law, safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of workers, pay great
attention to safety at work and protect the safety of state property and
people’s life… We should improve the socialist legal system, We must see
to it that there are laws to go by, the laws are observed and strictly
enforced, and law-breakers are prosecuted.… We must see to it that all
people are equal before the law…”
This stress on law-abiding behavior, in this Chinese context, must go
hand in hand with the rule of virtue — a good, moral, responsible action.
The socialist spiritual civilization is still as significant as the rule of law with
an reinvention of ideological and ethical education Some of the concepts
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4 This is a tradition from Verdery’s ethnography of the state, “a close examination of the
daily routines and practices of the state (1996: 209-10).” The ethnographic data is helpful in
disclosing the detailed practices, actions, and resistance taking place in everyday life during
the process of post-socialist transformation. In this paper, I do not intend or claim to glorify
old days of socialism nor to speak for the workers. Rather, most of the quotations from my
interviews are efforts to makes sense of worker’s devastating situation. 
and language, such as self-reliance (kaoziji), challenges (tiaozhan), and self-
confidence (zixin) are dominant in state discourse and propaganda.
In the process of reform, China institutionalized various new laws — the
Bankruptcy Law of 1986, the Enterprise Law of 1988, the Statistics Law of
1993, and the Labor Law of 1994. These new laws provided legitimacy to
private economic activities and protection for private property. At the same
time, the new laws have granted opportunities and space for self-regulating,
independent actions to enterprises and to every citizens. As clause 27 of the
Labor Law states, “Employing units on the verge of bankruptcy and under-
going rectification according to the Law, as well as those facing severe busi-
ness difficulties, can dismiss workers if necessary.” Individual responsibility
becomes a good virtue for each citizen; and for enterprise, this implies the
slow demise of soft-budget constraints, and that enterprises now have to
survive on their own without a dependence on the state to bail out their
debts (M.K. Lee, 2000: 69). That is, state enterprises must “enterprise them-
selves” in the principle of self-management (ziwo jingying), self-responsibili-
ty for profits and losses (zifu yingkui), self-development (ziwo fazhan), and
self-regulation (ziwo yaoshu).
A few successful ex-worker-turned entrepreneurs are good, model exam-
ples of the new employment policy, “workers finding employment on their
own initiative.” In 2001, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made a deci-
sion to admit capitalists and private managers into the party and even to
name them “model workers.” In addition, in 2002, four business men were
given May Day medals and another 17 businessmen in Shaanxi province
were named “model workers,” for other workers to emulate. Party General
Secretary Jiang Zemin announced that people in the private sector can be
good, model citizens of China by obeying the law and contributing to the
economic growth of society. In his theory of “three representatives,” Jiang
insists that the Party must represent advanced productive forces, the most
advanced culture and the broad interests of the masses, not just workers.
The “Three Represents” ideology holds that the party must represent the
foremost production forces, the most advanced culture (like Western
European countries), and the broad interests (guangdao) of the masses (not
just workers, but everybody). The productive forces encompass technology,
knowledge, labor, management, and capital. That is, there are multiple ways
to produce value and surplus value, of which labor from workers is only
one way. Capital, technology, and management are meaningful elements in
the production of wealth and the development of the forces of production in
China. Unlike the past, it is not fair or appropriate to give a privileged sta-
tus only to state workers. Thus, the party must represent the interests of
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other social groups in China — engineers, professionals, entrepreneurs,
managers, as well as the old classes of workers, peasants, and intellectuals.
The base for the CCP must be extended to welcome capitalists, the enemy of
the past, since they are also the contributors to socialism with Chinese char-
acteristics. 
The significance of the “Three Represents” lies in the scientific justifica-
tion of an adaptation to neo-liberal reform — the new direction that the CCP
has to take for greater integration with the global economy and entry into
the WTO, which deviates markedly from the past. In 1989 after the
Tiananmen Massacre, Jiang Zemin did not allow capitalists to become mem-
bers of CCP. The new direction of the CCP indicates that it is not just a
workers’ party anymore, but aims to become a party for all citizens regard-
less of their class background. It also prepares to revise the constitution to
admit more of the new rich as members at the November party congress of
2002. Likewise, the Trade Union is also an organization for all people,
including employers. According to the official website of the All China
Federation of Trade Unions, it is stated (www.acftu.org.cn/about.htlm),
“The fundamental task of the Chinese Trade Union is to carry out the vari-
ous social functions of the trade unions in line with the guiding principle of
reflecting and safeguarding concrete interests of the workers and staff mem-
bers in a better way while safeguarding the overall interests of the people
throughout the whole country.” Even the vice-chairman of the All China
Federation of Trade Unions, Li Qisheng praised capitalists by saying, 
“These entrepreneurs, who operate legally, and work honestly, are also
contributors to socialist construction. The awards of “model workers”
have to keep pace with time and tide. The fact that private businessmen
win honours just as workers confirms that they are also the builders of
socialism, and private businessmen are also laborers and those who have
made contributions to the nation are also eligible for the title” (Financial
Times, May 1, 2002; Reuters, May 1, 2002). 
The “good” workers in the past were the politically pure, revolutionary
ones who were willing to help other workers. Now, the Chinese Trade
Union, just like the state, is also promoting the idea of the productive
“Homo Economicus, “ who is innovative, and forward-looking to advance
economic development in marketized China. Capitalists — formerly a
“bad” class — the exploiters in the past, are now accepted as “model work-
ers” and contributing “citizens” to be loved and respected in newly marke-
tized China.5
To build capitalist institutions in China requires a change in ethics, behav-
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iors, and attitudes of people who have experienced the period of socialism,
and of those, who retain the old socialist “habitus” of institutional depen-
dency. People who are over forty’s, particularly those who experienced the
political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, are not really fit to understand
and to contribute to the new logic of profit, efficiency, and the market. That
is, from the state's perspective, the socialist habitus in Bourdieu's sense has
to be modified to a new mind and soul that are more appropriate for the
responsible, rational, self-reliant capitalist man.6 Some reasons for the state’s
ideological campaign for successful stories of entrepreneurs can be found in
Dickson’s (2002: 262) argument that these private business men could be
“good” citizens to the government because they belong to a “non-critical”
sphere of civil society.
In the next section, I examine the flip side of this making of “new” citi-
zens, the promotion of economically independent, entrepreneurial, self-car-
ing non-workers by the state. This disciplinary aspect of the economic citi-
zenship is not one way street, but can also be employed as a contentious
arena between the state and unemployed workers, though not as an intend-
ed consequences of the state policy. Unlike common stereotypes, power
relations are not merely spaces for total domination or social control, but are
simultaneously arenas for possible contentions as well as resistance. This is
similar to the notion of “contentious politics” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly,
2001), which “overlaps with a regime’s prescribed form of political partic-
ipation, often falls into the area of political expression tolerated by the
regime.” Where there is power, there always is resistance (Foucault, 1978:
95), and they are two sides of the same coin. The disciplinary practice of the
state provides both constraint and opportunities for adaptive responses in
various forms. In addition, unlike Blecher’s claim, the unemployed workers
are not really the passive recipients of the state practice or the mystified
who just support the CCP.7 Victims are not quite the same as supporters.
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5 In the past, workers, poor and lower middle peasants, revolutionary army men belonged
to the “good” class while landlords, rich peasants, capitalists, and rightists belong to the
“bad” class (Zang, 2000; Wortzel, 1987). Now, the Chinese state does not “permit the workers
to weep, refuses the workers’ demands, and even tramples upon the workers’ right to orga-
nize their own trade unions.” (Reuters, 09-20-02)
6 As Eyal, Szelenyi, and Townsely pointed out (1998: 9),
…the individual who is able to reshuffle their portfolio of ‘stocks’ and alter their
habitus is indeed a part of a process of social evolution, adapting to meet social
change.… [The] habitus they carry from the immediate past [socialism] is not appro-
priate to altered circumstances, and [they] look for other models of behavior and
society which are accessible to them.
7 As Perry (1993: 5) argues in the past, “…Chinese workers were not a tabular rasa on which
Party cadres could write whatever political messages suited their designs. Workers were heir 
In the case of China, the state practice of making “modern” Homo
Economicus is constantly challenged and resisted by unemployed workers,
as cases of protests and court litigations have been widely reported. Being
laid off means that workers become ordinary people outside the factory, as
opposed to workers of an enterprise. Does this provide chances for new
political actions against the state practice? Under tight state control where a
strike is illegal and extremely dangerous, and where political rebels are sent
to the total institutions such as labor camps and psychiatric asylums, do
unemployed workers just accept the vision of the marketized China propa-
gated by the state? Do they feel their situation is justified? Are they merely
victims of the “mystification” of the thought work? Based on my fieldwork
as well as recent documentary reports on the protests and litigation , I dis-
covered two types of responses to the state practice of making workers
“modern” Homo Economicus in Northeast China. I argue that these two
types of actions are not mutually exclusive, but rather situational, contin-
gent upon both the social context and unemployed workers’ interpretation
of the situation. Unemployed workers in Northeast China engage in the
political actions of 1) challengers: who embrace the political aspect of “rule of
law,” and creatively reinterpret it and act to defend their old social entitle-
ment from the past; and 2) Evaders:8 who are non-compliant to the new state
policy, but rather engage in the spontaneous, individualized activity of sub-
sistence survival in everyday life.
POST-PROLETARIAT: FROM VICTIMS TO CHALLENGERS
Most unemployed workers in China do not enjoy wealth and prosperity
of the market after being laid-off. On the edge of economic destitution and
poverty, some engage in political action by protesting, writing petition let-
ters, and litigating. These actions remain mostly within the boundary of the
law and allow these workers to claim to be “good, responsible citizens”
(Lee, 2002; 2000: O’Brien, 2002). They claim to be political, juridical citizens
with legal rights and entitlements to state welfare. As a matter of fact, work-
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to their own traditions of protest, rooted in native-place cultures and workplace experiences.”
Studying labor fragmentation under the Republican Period, Elizabeth Perry (1993) argues that
labor is fragmented along the lines of skill, regional origin, gender and native-place.
8 This is somewhat similar to the notion of everyday resistance. According to James Scott
(1989), the examples of everyday forms of resistance are foot dragging, dissimulation, feigned
ignorance, false compliance, manipulation, flight, slander, theft, arson, sabotage, etc. These
actions should not be ignored because they are the most vital means by which subordinate
classes manifest their political interests.
ers’ collective action is mostly carried out peacefully and challenges primar-
ily the abuses and illegal activities of the local government. Workers are
generally very cautious not to engage in ‘illegal’ activity in order to avoid
direct confrontation and brutal oppression. They confront numerous cases
of inappropriate behaviors of local state officials and managers, such as
unfair dismissal, delaying payment, insufficient severance pay, injuries suf-
fered on the job, stealing money, and running away with workers’ pensions.
Unemployed workers became agitated, and radicalized when such corrupt-
ed activities take away their livelihoods and entitlements. Angered by injus-
tice, mistreatment and corruption, these unemployed workers demand that
labor laws be honored and that the legal rights of unemployed workers be
protected. For their survival and protection, workers adopt the concepts and
the language of “modern citizens” and the “Rule of Law” from the central
state to legitimate their actions. The new regulations and documents from
the central state become useful weapons to tackle local officials and busi-
nessmen. The employment of citizenship can be a good example of “Right-
ful Resistance” which operates within official norms; “1) operates near the
boundary of an authorized channel; 2) employs the rhetoric and commit-
ments of the powerful to curb political and economic power; 3) hinges on
locating and exploiting divisions among the powerful.” (O’Brien, 1996)
Much of the industrial rustbelt in northeast China has experienced labor
unrest and protest by unemployed workers. In 2002, almost 100,000 unem-
ployed workers in northeast China participated in a sustained protest to
demand their “legal” right to work and compensation in the cities of
Daqing and Liaoyang (Shijie Ribao 3-5-02; NYT 5-17-00). They demanded
payment of overdue pensions, and sufficient unemployment severance fees.
Carrying the poster of the late Chairman Mao Zedong and citing the
speeches of central authorities such as Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, these
workers sought the right to work, to be paid, to eat and to survive. For
example, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (July 8, 2002) reported that “To workers
in Daqing, the bad guys are the local officials or bosses, not the central poli-
cies that allow those officials to get away with withholding paychecks or
possibly even lining their own pockets. Their only demand is to have
enough to eat.” However, as the protest intensified and some workers were
arrested, unemployed workers started to push toward more “radical” agen-
das such as removal of corrupted officials,9 the release of workers,10 even
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9 Gong Shangwu, a leader of Liaoyang’s representatives to the People’s Congress told the
media that Liaoyang simply does not have an unemployment problem on March 11th. In the
next days, angry unemployed workers in Liaoyang demanded the resignation of Gong and
support for their livelihood.
the freedom to organize an independent trade union through sustained,
constant protests. Under the Chinese constitution, an independent trade
union and strikes are illegal because Chinese socialism supposedly eliminat-
ed the contradictions between the workers and the employers under the
name of “all people’s enterprises.” The 2002 protests in Daqing and
Liaoyang suggest that workers are mostly acting within the existing legal
boundaries, but the boundary is challenged and pushed throughout these
actions.11 The protests in northeast China during the spring of 2002 were
new watershed for political citizenship in China because unlike in the past,
these actions were massive, well-organized among different factories, and
sustained for more than ten weeks.
These protests are only a tiny percentage of actual events that took place
in China. For examples, in the year 2003, in Shanghai, Nov 5, 2003, protest-
ers gathered outside the municipal government building to demonstrate
against the layoffs, and in Changsha, Dec 13, workers demanded govern-
ment aides and help after the looming layoffs. The events at Xiafan city in
November, 13, 2003 had the largest numbers of demonstrators with about
7,000 workers protesting against the layoffs. The year 2004 was also marked
with numerous protests in Xian (Sept 13), Baoding and Tangshang (Sept 15-
18), Xiangyang (Sept 14-Oct. 22), Qiqihr (Oct 11), Baotou (Oct 12-18),
Wanzhou (Oct 18), Jinning (Oct 18), Funing (Oct 20), Bengbu (Oct 22), and
Luzhou (Dec 21). Workers blocked traffic, occupied the factory, surrounded
the government offices, went on strike against the layoffs, corruptions,
unpaid wages, and for government responsibility for social welfare and job
security.12
Furthermore, there has been a rapid upsurge in litigation, and in 2001,
155,000 labor disputes were filed (Gallagher, 2002). According to an official
report from the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, by the end of 2001,
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10 For the more detailed stories of the arrest and detainment of workers, see Amnesty
International Report (April, 2002) “Detained and Imprisoned Labor Rights Activists” and
Reuters report (May, 13, 2002), “Chinese Workers protest over detained leaders,” (May, 9,
2002) “Northeast China workers resume protest and threats,” (March 22, 2002) “China Party
keen to keep worker protests calm,” also Far Eastern Economic Review (April 4, 2002), “Noth-
ing to Celebrate,” Washington Post (March 22, 2002) “With Carrots and Sticks, China Quiets
Protesters.” NYT (March, 18, 19, 26, 2002) “Leaner Factories, Fewer Workers Bring More
Labor Unrest to China,” “Chinese Protests Ebb as Officials Talk Tough, but Give Ground,”
“Where Workers, Too, Rust, Bitterness Boils Over.”
1011 China Labor Bulletin June, 4, 2002 reports a conversation with workers in Daqing; “we are
not worried. What should we be afraid of? We have nothing left, what can we be scared of?
We have nothing, we fear nothing. We are doing this for our own right.” 
12 These information are from China Rights Forum, No. 1, 2005. 
China had established 3,192 labor dispute arbitration committees at the
county-level or above, consisting of nearly 20,000 full-time and part-time
arbitrators. The central state granted each citizen rights to sue local officials
as guaranteed in the Administrative Litigation Law in 1990. In July, 1987 the
State Council revitalized the national labor dispute arbitration system and
the 1995 Labor Law expanded the scope of arbitration and legal action (Lee,
2002). The number of civil litigation cases doubled from 1,455,130 cases in
1988 to 2,718,533 in 1995, and workers’ lawsuits increased from 17,000 in
1992 to half a million in 2000 (Seattle Times, 07-02-02). There have been sto-
ries of alliances between lawyers, law students and workers, or about work-
ers studying the labor law by themselves to go to court to fight. Mostly,
workers use litigation to press claims against corruption and injustice, and
the increase in law suits can be understood as workers’ utilization of the
social space given by the state.13 These political actions of protest, litigation,
writing petitions, or visiting the central authority in Beijing are economical-
ly based acts of desperation for people with no other alternative. To chal-
lengers, there seems to be no alternatives to improve unemployed workers’
livelihood and subsistence without these political actions. Economic desper-
ation and increasing polarization are also crucial and the corruption of local
state officials without central supervision has also played a critical role.
Some describes these situations as the change of economic grievances into
political disputes (Sheehan, 1998). “Give me my job back,” or “Workers
need to eat,” “We need money” are the most common slogans. In spite of
the recent upsurges of the collective resistance in the old rustbelt of north-
east China, most of time these actions are still very localized, and economic
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13 For example, recent scholarship of the Chinese law points out the social space granted by
these recent legal changes,
“The Law of the PRC on State Compensation, promulgated in May 1994, requires
that if state agencies or members of their personnel infringe on the lawful rights or
interests of a citizen, they should compensate him or her. Since the implementation
of this law, people’s courts at the intermediate and national levels have set up com-
pensation committees, which have settled hundreds of cases claiming state compen-
sation. Effective since October 1, 1999, the Administrative Reconsideration Law of
the PRC allows citizens to bring lawsuits against various policy documents issued
by government agencies at different administrative levels, if they feel that such doc-
uments have encroached on their rights.” (Yu Xingzhong, 2002: 302)
“The Chinese state is encouraging the use of courts, which it sees as integral to a sta-
ble society and consistent with its goal of reining in local bureaucrats. In 1996, the
Supreme People’s Court decreed that Chinese courts should “further improve the
work of trying civil cases, protect the civil rights and interests of citizens and legal
persons according to the law, and promote the just, safe, civilized and healthy
development of society.” (Margaret Y.K. Woo, 2002: 318)
in character. The employment of legal, judicial, political citizenship by
unemployed workers has become a serious contestant to the state. In a
strange sense, these challengers can be regarded as “true” citizens of China
since the Chinese constitution still claims China to be a “socialist state under
the people’s democratic dictatorship, led by the working class.”
POST-PROLETARIAT AS EVADERS
In my fieldwork in Changchun, the majority of unemployed workers rep-
resented the other type of response, people who are busy with improving
their subsistence level rather than politically challenging the state and lead-
ers with protests and litigation. A few stories of political protests and legal
actions can be heard, but overall, unemployed workers were demystified,
and did not have much confidence in political, juridical, legal institutional
processes. Political action does not seem to be possible or inevitable to these
people. The ideas of unemployed workers are a defensive notion of survival
(shengcun), eating (chifan), and getting by in contrast to the state ideology of
the risk-taking economic citizen, the private entrepreneurs or political,
social entitlement of protesters and litigators. However, like Challengers,
they also miss the stable and safe period of the past, under Mao Zhedong in
their selective reconstruction of memories and become really stressed about
the uncertain market economy (C.K. Lee, 2000; Rofel, 1999). One noted,
“Under Maoism, everybody was basically the same and it was the best
time for workers. Not much money, but not much pressure either.
However, nowadays, there are wide gaps between the rich and the poor,
and it is just too much pressure to get by. “14
The economic ‘security ‘(anquan) and ‘stability’ (wending) are important
concepts to the this type of people. They do not want to move to other cities
for jobs or to get jobs in the private or foreign sector of the economy because
they fear the uncertain labor conditions, such as the greater labor intensity
without job security or welfare benefits. As a result, they look for jobs in
their neighborhoods, such as repairing bikes, watching bike lots, or selling
some small things in the street market. One unemployed worker said,
“I know everybody here, I grew up here, and my child goes to the
school here. I have ‘feelings (ganqing)’ for this place where I also have
friends and family. I have somebody to rely on in case of emergency.
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14 Interview, Changchun, May 2001.
However, how can I give up everything and start all over in my age?
It’s not realistic to get a new job in a new place. I am too old for that.”15
In addition, they do not have trust or belief in the ‘fairness” of the politi-
cal, and legal processes to openly defy the state. The need to survive, and to
eat and take care of children and parents, educate children and provide
health care for parents are unemployed workers’ main concerns, but they do
not have confidence in the political action against the state. As with chal-
lengers in this paper, these unemployed workers are upset with poverty and
corruption, but there is not much time to build ‘solidarity’ with other unem-
ployed workers nor trust in the fairness of the legal, political system.
Furthermore, immediately after being laid-off, these workers avoided meet-
ing friends, relatives and other co-workers because this kind of social rela-
tionship requires money to eat and drink, and they do not want to talk
about their unemployment. Comradeship among unemployed workers is
not easy to build given the situation under which the trade union does not
play the role in organizing workers. In stereotype, unemployment is identi-
fied with incompetence, shame, pain, worries, and fear. They believe that
direct confrontation and challenge of the state may generate severe, brutal
oppression and violence. In their situation, both economic entreprenuership
and political actions are too risky.16
Unlike challengers, this type of evaders employs a rather non-confronta-
tional, and individualized way to vent their frustration and anger. Some
even expressed a kind of people’s consciousness (laobaixing yishi), not a
notion of citizenship. One worker was rather annoyed by my questions
regarding his take on the government policies and leadership, and stated,
“Why do you keep asking about MY opinion? Do you really believe
what I think matters here? What kind of question is that? What I think
does not count in China. Only managers and political leaders have voices.
The government does not care about us, and does not listen to us. Even
when they do, their resolution is only temporary, and can not really solve
the fundamental problem. Basically, we are abandoned by the state and
leaders, and our fate is really miserable (feican mingyun). The key for me
is, I have to make a living day by day for my family no matter what.
There is nothing that the state and leaders can do for my family.”17
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16 This is similar to what Dorothy Solinger (2001: 76), calls the “passive responses” or “polit-
ical inaction.” She quotes from an unemployed worker “We have no time for demonstrations,
we have to work.” However, I would like to emphasize on the more subtle or nuanced type of
noncompliance by not engaging in the state project of making “citizenship.” 
A cynical, demystified perspective of the state, the party, and leaders can
be also found in their views on the protests and litigation. These workers
heard about labor protests in other cities, but they do not believe that collec-
tive action would be able to bring about the consequences they wanted.
They are keenly aware of the limits of their ability to directly challenge the
hegemonic central state without inviting brutal oppression. There seems to
be little faith in the legal process that deals with workers’ requests or the
general fairness in the system. New institutional regulations to support
workers seemed to be ‘irrelevant’ to these unemployed workers. The uncer-
tainty of winning, and the slow process of the court decision, discouraged
workers from filing legal complaints. One worker, Mr. Zhang, angrily shout-
ed,
“The law might be modern, rational, and good but it simply does not
work. We don’t live in the society with “rule of law”. (fazhi shehui) Why?
Look at us! Do you really think the law solves our problem? If it does,
why do I live like this now in the first place? The reform has not been
good to us, and I know every official is corrupt. Otherwise, why were
some laid-off, while some were not. Is this based on the rule of law?
Unemployment is not based on regulation (xiagang meiyou shenme
biaozhun, bu guifan). If you have connection with leaders, you are OK, but
if you do not, you are going to be laid-off, and you will be doomed. There
is always a backdoor for everything. Of course, we want some changes,
but it is not realistic at this stage. We have to face the reality, and our real-
ity is not quite the same as those in xiagang workers in TV (dianshili xia-
gang zhigong gen women taiyuan le). They are just myths (shenhua).”18
In their pessimism, they are not willing to accept the state’s propaganda
of the new, modern, Homo Economicus of the marketized China. Some
unemployed workers asked managers of help for several times, but it was
of no use. All they heard was “no way out” (meiyou banfa) again and again.
Furthermore, in some cases, some are not even aware of the state’s preferen-
tial treatment for xiagang workers,19 nor do they see any benefit in joining
the state-sponsored reemployment project. Demystification of state practice
and legal process is not rare among unemployed workers, and these lead to
several “small” incidents of resistance. Rather than participating in state-
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17 Interview, Changchun, July 2001.
18 Interview, Changchun, May 2001. Names are pseudonyms to keep subjects anonymous.
19 Generally, this is called, “eating fragrance (chixiang).” That is, xiagang workers are eligible
for more benefits than other types of unemployed workers and migrant workers. For exam-
ple, employers who hire several xiagang workers can receive tax exemptions, but in spite of
these regulations, still not many xiagang workers become beneficiaries.
sponsored training programs, they economize their individual spending,
eating only one or two meals per day, eating the same thing over again
without meat, not buying any new furniture or clothes, and receiving some
free leftovers from street markets. Their spending is mostly on eating and
daily survival. Nevertheless, workers have serious doubts on the effective-
ness of the state- initiated reemployment project since the projects involve
too many ideology education classes and lack substantive skill training for
the future jobs, as one unemployed worker, Mr. Chen, pointed out,
“You know, there are more unemployed workers in those reemploy-
ment service centers than my old factory. They did nothing for me, and I
am sick and tired of these ideology (sixiang) classes. I have filled out so
many applications for jobs, but I have not heard anything from them.
Enough is enough. I know there is nothing the state can do for us. (guojia
ye meiyou banfa). I do not want to waste any more time, I have a family to
feed…”20
As a matter of fact, the reemployment rate for unemployed workers was
only nine percent in the first half of a year 2002, according to the report from
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security (caijing interview). In fact, most
unemployed workers stayed unemployed for extended periods of time.
Disillusioned and embittered, unemployed workers are looking for a way to
avoid any direct involvement with state discipline. According to the official
statistics, seventy-three percent of unemployed workers do not want to par-
ticipate in the state-sponsored training at the reemployment service centers
and seventy percent do not actually participate in any kind of training (Yu,
2000).21 There have been reports that workers refused to enter the reemploy-
ment service centers after being laid-off, and refused to receive xiagang
Identification for their evidence of unemployment. This is a somewhat
anonymous, quiet action of refusal and noncompliance to the state in daily
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20 Interview, Beijing, June 2001.
21 Solinger (2002: 318) provides the reasons for the failure of reemployment centers, “Train-
ing projects often miss the mark: instruction was offered without regard to market demand,
the official funds don’t arrive.” In addition, in a city of Moshan, where more than fifteen thou-
sand workers are laid off, only seventeen hundred workers entered the reemployment service
centers, just ten percent of all laid off workers. They are even refusing to receive the xiagang
ID, because they regard the reemployment service centers as the one which eventually termi-
nates their labor relations with the work-unit, not the one providing welfare benefits. Even
when they know about the reemployment service centers, often time they refused to enter
them due to fear of terminating labor relations with work-unit. I was even told of stories of
workers who refuse to receive any training because of fear that it might jeopardize any
chances of going back to the original work-unit. This is especially true to those workers on
involuntary long vacations (fangjia), and still maintain labor relations with work-unit.
life. Even though these are ‘small’ events, this kind of action can deflect the
state’s disciplinary practice of making “economic” citizens — Homo
Economicus. 
COMPARISON: CHALLENGERS VS. EVADERS 
“Our conditions are not quite the same (qingkuang buyiyang)” was one of
the most common sentences I heard from the unemployed workers in my
fieldwork. These two types of reactions, — collective protests, litigation vs.
individualized refusal, non-compliance — are to some extent time-space
contingent, depending on both structural conditions and subjective inter-
pretation, both on the configuration of various forces such as political con-
trol, and opportunity structures, as well as on the unemployed workers’
reading of the situation, though they both are based on anger, frustration,
and even rage against the state and leaders.
Challengers can be more easily found in medium, and small cities in
Northeast China such as Daqing, and Liaoyang where political control is
less tight and economic opportunities are more rare than in the bigger cities
such as Changchun, Shenyang or Harbin. In a recent report on worker
unrest in Daqing, Liaoyang, and Fushun (HRW, 2002), unemployed workers
felt that there was no alternative to receive their due other than collective
demonstration. There are few job opportunities to make a living outside
their original work-units. The non-state sector and the service sector of the
economy are not growing sufficiently to absorb the unemployed in these
cities. However, capital cities of provinces in the region, such as Changchun,
Shenyang, and Harbin are centers of the service economy in northeast
China, and they do not usually allow open protests to take place with more
tight political control. Even if it occurs, the state quickly reacts to pacify
workers by employing both stick and carrot tactics- police crackdown,
detainment of workers as well as assurances that it will solve unemployed
workers’ problems such as payment of unpaid wages, pension and compen-
sation. In fact, it is often much harder to remain challengers in big cities. In
Changchun, unemployed workers from a local tractor factory joined a rally
to demand unpaid compensation for two days, but they went back to their
routine everyday life once local state officials promised and paid the money.
The major difference between the two is whether they embrace or reject
the notion of “rule of law” for the new, modern citizens in, rational, marke-
tized China. Against the imposition of economic rationality by the state,
challengers demand their social entitlement of welfare benefits, and for
political, legal, juridical rationality of the state, in addition to state’s eco-
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nomic logic. As they see it, the rationality in the economic arena should go
hand in hand with the rationality in politics, and the law. In this sense, they
play within the game of modern, rational Chinese citizenship by asking for
“inclusion” in the political, and legal decision-making process. However,
victimized by economic rationality and the logic of efficiency, evaders do
not have confidence or belief in the game of modern, rational citizenship,
and eventually they become very cynical and demystified by the whole
process, by the game itself. They are the ones who refuse to join the game of
modern, rational, marketized citizenship, and resort to remaining outsiders.
For them, the game is reserved for state officials, managers, and new rich
people.
T.H. Marshall’s classic definition of citizenship — civil, political, and legal
citizenship — is an interesting and powerful analysis of emerging citizen-
ship in the European context. However, it has limitations when directly
applied to the Chinese case. T.H. Marshall has a rather evolutionary view of
three citizenships. The first one is the individual right to property, freedom
— civil citizenship. The second one is the right to participate in the political
process of the decision-making such as voting behavior — political citizen-
ship. Finally, the last one is the right to welfare and social security — social
citizenship. However, my view in this paper is a more interactive perspec-
tive of citizenship, as an arena for contentious politics, both granted by the
state and gained by the population. Thus I do not assume any evolutionary
stages of development of citizenship between these two types of responses.
In other words, challengers are not “Modern” — radical, progressive, coura-
geous, and evaders are not “traditional” — passive, pliable, apolitical.22 It is
very problematic to assume that there is one “correct” or “best” way to
resist the domination and power of the state. 
THE CHINESE POST-PROLETARIAT: DIVIDED AND FRAGMENTED
Unlike Marx’s vision of “Workers of the world united,” unemployed
workers in China are not a would-be-revolutionary class of the future. The
unity of the unemployed workers does not seem to be plausible, but at the
same time, they are not blind followers of the CCP. Their resignation is not
quite the same as acceptance. In this paper, I discuss two subtle types of
political action taken by unemployed workers in China that go beyond the
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22 For the more detailed discussion of the strong organizational control over society, and
consequent collective inaction, see Xueguang Zhou (1993)’s “Unorganized Interests and
Collective Action in Communist China.”
binary stereotypes of violent, militant struggle and blind submission. They
do not accept the state practice of making “economic citizen,” but find vari-
ous ways to contest and challenge the state’s new unemployment policy
and its implementation. 
According to an empirical report on classes in the Chinese Academy of
Social Science (2002), which was banned from circulation due to its critical
tone of the recent reform, unemployed workers have become the lowest
class among ten classes24 in the bottom of the class hierarchy in Chinese
society, the truly disadvantaged who are facing exclusion from labor rela-
tions, not exploitation within labor relation. This kind of exclusion is more
devastating and brutal than exploitation. In this sense, the notion of 
oppression needs to be broadened to incorporate the devastating situation
of unemployed workers, and to grasp the politics outside the point of pro-
duction, for instances, the practices and lived experiences of everyday life
(de Certeau, 1988) or the politics of unemployment. Workers are no longer
permanently located within the relations of production, and have been
pushed into society.
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TABLE 1. COMPARISON BETWEEN CHALLENGERS VS. EVADERS23
Challengers Evaders
Major form Protest, Litigation Refusal, non-compliance
Of political action
Political Control Less Tight Tight
Economic Opportunities Rare seldom, but exist 
Attitude Angry, frustrated, raged Cynical, demystified
But embrace the notion reject the notion of 
Of “Rule of Law” “Rule of Law”
Mode of Action Formal, Open, Political, Informal, disguised 
Collective Rituals Individualized Routine
23 O’Brien (1996: 34) makes a distinction between these two types of resistance. The major
differences lie in their forms: noisy rather than quiet, public rather than disguised, open rather
than anonymous. “…unlike everyday resisters, rightful resisters seek rather than avoid the
attention of elites… Rightful resistance is thus a product of state building and of opportunities
created by the spread of participatory ideologies and patterns of rule tooted in notions of
equality, rights and rule of law.”
24 They are state officials, managers, entrepreneurs, technicians, office clerk, small business
owners, service workers, industrial workers, peasants, and unemployed workers in the order
of social hierarchy.
In addition, the “correct” way of class thinking is institutionalized and
monopolized by the state and through the official media propaganda in
China. Anyone can be considered to be good, model workers who obey and
are loyal to the new marketized practice of the state. In this situation, it is
hard to expect well-organized nation-wide collective action directly against
the Chinese state in the old Marxist sense, and unemployed workers’
actions are very quirky, and sometimes unfixed. In this context, the reform
and changing practice of employment, xiagang have provided both opportu-
nities and constraints for the unemployed workers. For most unemployed
workers, the state practice of creating “normal,” rational, economic citizens
stigmatizes the rest as “abnormal,” incapable, lazy, inefficient and irrational
to rely on the “excessive” state welfare.25 Against the new practice of citi-
zenship, most unemployed workers are frustrated and resentful. Some
workers embraced the notion of “good, responsible (political) citizens” to
defend their entitlement and engage in the collective action while some
chose not to accept the state practice of citizenship, and become very cynical
and demystified. These responses reveal the various ways to deal with the
imposition of “normality” by the state. Rather than accepting their situation
as “abnormal,” or “shameful,” some try to improve their situation by utiliz-
ing the prevailing notion of “citizenship,” while some others seek alterna-
tive ways to improve their subsistence other than the direct engagement
with the practice of the citizenship. These two types of political action entail
that the state practice of making “economic citizens” has unintended conse-
quences by opening the possibilities for multiple issues in post-Socialist
China. 
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